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I 
 
During the Occupation of France, food was a national obsession. Rationing and shortages 
were the focus of daily life, and the subject of countless conversations within families, 
between neighbours, or in the interminable queues outside shops. Here recipes and tips 
were shared, the government’s latest directives were discussed, rumours were spread, 
anxieties were nourished, and arguments were sparked.1 Food stories were rarely off the 
front pages of any of the authorized newspapers, fuelling food concerns. Food poverty 
threatened the health and well-being of young and old alike.2 In Ritournelle de la faim (a 
novel inspired by his mother’s life in the 1930s and 1940s) J. M. G. Le Clézio defined wartime 
hunger as ‘une sensation étrange, durable, invariable, presque familière pourtant. Comme 
un hiver qui ne finirait pas’.3 Shortages commonly featured in urban children’s playground 
songs, with such telling refrains as ‘Y’a pas de pain chez nous’.4 Wartime diaries are littered 
with references to food issues, with inequality of access a recurrent theme. The journalist 
Jean Galtier-Boissière, for example, who enjoyed fine wining and dining before the war, 
reflected in his diary on the food riches available to some in the black-market restaurants of 
occupied Paris, while the Groult sisters detailed the ever-worsening restrictions, and the 
health consequences, in their Journal à quatre mains.5 Memories of the obsession lingered. 
When asked in 1969, twenty-five years after the Liberation, to identify the principal wartime 
preoccupation of the French, Marcel Verdier, the pharmacist interviewed in Marcel Ophüls’s 
Le Chagrin et la pitié, replied emphatically ‘La nourriture. La nourriture!’6 
 2 
 
Food is of course tied to human needs and desires; but—indeed, nowhere more so 
than in France—it is also tied to national culture and identity.7 In wartime, food can become 
a replacement currency, when, for example, neighbours swap eggs for fuel; or, on a more 
sinister level, it can be a means of control used by those with food power, rendering it in 
extreme cases a weapon of starvation.8 Beyond such material applications, but precisely 
because of its material significance, food can equally be employed as a formidable weapon 
of propaganda in a battle for influence over public opinion. Many French wartime players 
understood this, from Vichy itself, to the internal resistance and the resistance leadership 
outside France.   
This article focuses on one war of words over food fought between two specific 
opposing Frances, namely the Vichy regime in France and Free France in London. While 
Vichy swamped French people with propaganda on radio (on which we shall focus here), on 
film and newsreels, and in the press, Free France’s principal means of communication with 
metropolitan France from June 1940 was the BBC’s French Service. Its most important 
programme was the thirty-minute Les Français parlent aux Français, broadcast daily at 8.30 
p.m. between 6 September 1940 and 22 November 1944. During the Second World War, 
radio, then in its heyday, was heavily used as an instrument of propaganda by the different 
parties in the conflict. Its reach was significant in France, where between 31 and 43 per cent 
of households had a licensed wireless during the war, rising to between 47 and 58 per cent 
if estimated unlicensed sets are included.9 Germany and Vichy both feared the BBC; each 
banned listening in June and October 1940 respectively. But large numbers of people 
listened nonetheless, as Vichy knew. A report dated 16 October 1940, on public opinion in 
the occupied zone, confirmed that ‘à Paris, dans les files d’attente, au seuil des magasins 
des quartiers populaires comme des quartiers bourgeois, les gens échangent à haute voix 
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leurs commentaires sur la “Radio anglaise”.’10 Moreover, correspondence received by the 
BBC from later 1940 confirmed that listeners were tuning in across France, with one ‘typical’ 
letter received in May 1942 noting that 105 out of 110 wirelesses in a village of 150 
households were regularly tuned to its broadcasts.11 Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac, a key Free 
France operative in London and later historian, argued that people in France listened to the 
BBC because they appreciated its swift reporting of news and thought it more lively and 
honest than Radio Vichy. He contended that the BBC’s influence was immense by 1944, as 
the landings approached, but noted that many were also by then listening regularly to 
Vichy’s star broadcaster, Philippe Henriot.12 The ferocity of the war of words between 
Henriot and the French Service, to which further reference will be made, was perhaps the 
clearest confirmation that both sides considered radio work as war work, and strategically 
important in their propaganda efforts.13 
Research on wartime broadcasting in French has confirmed radio’s significance in the 
wider propaganda war, alongside the importance of the specific encounter between these 
two Frances. Hélène Eck, Aurélie Luneau, Tim Brooks and Kay Chadwick have all supported 
Crémieux-Brilhac’s conclusions about the BBC’s appeal to listeners in France, alongside the 
draw of Henriot’s broadcasts. Their analyses of programme substance and strategy have 
concentrated on the political and military messages propagated about resistance or 
collaboration, key incidents or players, or the progress of the conflict.14 The French Service 
and Vichy frequently mobilized the same topics to their respective propaganda ends, for 
example, Joan of Arc, the French Empire or Anglo-French historical relations; and food was 
no exception. Food’s critical importance to human survival gives it a tangible closeness to 
the everyday which renders it especially important in any war of words, and yet its 
importance to wartime radio propaganda has thus far been overlooked. By focussing on 
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food, this article offers a fresh understanding both of the lived experience of the Occupation 
and of the ways in which that propaganda functioned. It investigates how the French Service 
and Vichy dealt with the growing challenges of food production, supply and access in 
occupied France, competing to gain control of discourses about food in this time of 
shortage. It examines how both sides exploited food issues via a straightforward blame 
game in which each side held its enemies responsible for France’s food woes. For the French 
Service, this meant Vichy and Germany; for Vichy, it meant Britain and her Allies, the Free 
French abroad, and those considered unwelcome at home, principally foreigners, Jews and 
Communists. At the same time, the article analyses how both the French Service and Vichy 
mobilized food issues to speak to French people on trickier questions of national unity and 
solidarity, and assesses the problems they faced in their endeavours as they tried to square 
their claims and arguments with the experiences of the wider public. 
 
II 
 
The challenges posed by food production, supply and access grew incrementally from the 
early days of the Occupation. These, and the food-related behaviours they sparked, have 
been substantially explored by historians of the period. For example, Michel Cépède’s early 
study of food policy and output charts Vichy’s protracted efforts to establish a framework 
for agricultural activity in the form of the Corporation paysanne, positioning this alongside a 
narrative of falling production (especially after 1941, even in primarily agricultural regions), 
rising prices and diminishing rations.15 More recent analyses by Debbie Lackerstein and Éric 
Alary show that Vichy failed to understand farmers―despite claims to the contrary from 
Pétain―and failed to make the most of France’s agricultural potential, leading to 
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disintegrating relations with producers.16 For consumers, a ration ticket was no guarantee of 
supply, and German requisitioning exacerbated the shortages. The result was that, as 
Polymeris Voglis records, individual standard rations fell from 3000 calories per day before 
the war to 1365 calories in 1941 and 1115 in 1944, while those in Germany remained 
stable.17 People got by as best they could, by means of what Dominique Veillon calls ‘des 
ripostes graduées et multiformes’, such as help from family or friends who lived in better-
provisioned rural areas, raising small animals for food in urban environments, or purchasing 
on the developing black market—whose existence was proof that food was readily available, 
albeit at a price.18 Elsewhere, Paul Sanders, Fabrice Grenard and Kenneth Mouré highlight 
how the wartime food situation fuelled extensive parallel- and black-market activity, 
produce fraud (for example, shopkeepers who watered down milk, or sold stale goods as 
fresh), small- and large-scale profiteering and crime, and was the root of significant 
corruption within official circles.19 Such studies reveal a disparity of experience between the 
financially comfortable and those with fewer means, and between town and country, which 
raised questions of fairness and cast shadows over notions of social and national cohesion. 
Generally, urban dwellers suffered more than country folk, with near-famine conditions in 
some cities. But it has been amply demonstrated that a simple town–country dichotomy is 
unsatisfactory, and that experiences across urban and rural France were uneven. Cépède 
notes, for instance, that Marseille endured more food deprivation than Paris, which 
benefited from a nearby self-sufficient agricultural tradition.20 Elsewhere, quasi-
monocultural localities such as Hérault―where viticulture accounted for 80 per cent of 
output to the detriment of basic produce―meant food disadvantage, whereas polycultural 
Mayenne, where foodstuffs were the principal resource, was a ‘feeder’ department.21 
Moreover, as demonstrated in Shannon Fogg’s study of the Limousin—a region of diverse 
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and plentiful agricultural production—such areas where there was a surplus faced 
significant demands both from requisitioning by Vichy and the Germans, and from ordinary 
people who travelled in search of food. Urban–rural relationships came under significant 
pressure as a result.22 
Understandably, then, food was a critical issue for Vichy to handle in its relations with 
civil society. The theme could be mobilized to Vichy’s advantage, if the regime could foster 
confidence in its ability to manage supply and distribution, if it could convince people that it 
was able to deal with food irregularities and crime, and if it could successfully lay the blame 
for food difficulties with its enemies. But the domestic food situation also posed huge 
problems for Vichy, and offered easy and potent ammunition to the French Service. 
Rationing and shortages were issues of discontent for a hungry population, well aware of 
Pétain’s promise—made in a radio broadcast on 13 August 1940—that the government’s 
first task would be to ‘procurer à tous […] une alimentation suffisante’, and angered by the 
occupier’s pillaging of French resources in summer 1940 and by Vichy’s failure to prevent 
the Germans from excessive requisitioning.23 Vichy itself can have been in no doubt of the 
harsh food circumstances under which French people lived, or of their impact on public 
opinion. On 9 August, just days before Pétain’s broadcast, a summary of prefects’ reports on 
their regions noted that the food situation in many départements was tragic, and that fears 
for the harvest suggested that worse was to come.24 Pétain’s broadcast is evidence of the 
political significance of food at the time, and was manifestly an attempt to reassure. But 
subsequent summary reports stressed the preoccupation of ordinary people with their 
worsening situation, as Vichy failed to deliver on its promise and fundamental foodstuffs 
became progressively rarer.25 
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Food anxieties featured frequently in letters the BBC received from France from the 
early months of the Occupation. On 5 August 1940, for example, one correspondent wrote 
bitterly of the ‘pillage systématique des ressources françaises par les Allemands pourvus de 
francs qui ne leur coûtent rien’; on 9 September, another wrote that the Germans had just 
plundered the city of Clermont-Ferrand, leaving only two hundred sheep to feed the entire 
population that week; while, on 8 December, another lamented that ‘la nourriture se fait de 
plus en plus rare’.26 Such letters in all likelihood confirmed to the team in London that food 
was a valuable means to attack both Vichy and Germany, a conclusion borne out by the 
frequency with which French Service broadcasts thereafter operated to capitalize on French 
discontent. Moreover, as we shall see, food would subsequently be considered an important 
propaganda tool by the British Political Warfare Executive (PWE), which produced directives 
for BBC broadcast content from August 1941.27 But, equally, food was territory on which a 
bold defence of British action was needed, as Vichy repeatedly addedascribed France’s food 
problems to its list of British ‘crimes’. Its favourite strategy was to argue that Britain’s 
ongoing economic blockade of Germany, which had severe consequences for the 
provisioning of mainland Europe, was to blame for France’s hunger. The offensive began in 
earnest following Winston Churchill’s famous ‘The Few’ speech on 20 August 1940, in which 
he confirmed that Britain would not allow food to pass the blockade since this would either 
sustain Germany directly, or be pillaged by her from the countries under her control. In 
response, Paul Baudouin, Vichy’s ministre des Affaires étrangères, broadcast on 22 August 
that Britain’s blockade was ‘[un] terrible présage de famine’, and her commitment to 
maintain it was ‘un acte d’hostilité, pire peut-être que le douloureux attentat de Mers el-
Kébir’.28 Setting France’s hunger in the context of the recent controversial incident at Mers 
el-Kébir, on the coast of then French Algeria—where Britain had attacked the French fleet 
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on 3 July 1940 to prevent Germany seizing the ships, causing 1,297 French deaths—was a 
blatant attempt to foster Anglophobia by nurturing the idea that far more French would die 
from hunger as a result of the blockade than had died at Mers el-Kébir. The French Service 
was swift to respond. On 23 August, Pierre Bourdan and Georges Boris separately charged 
Baudouin with lying. Both instead blamed what they termed the German blockade within 
France, which forbade the movement of food from France’s provision-rich occupied zone to 
the needier unoccupied zone.29 The policy militated against the sharing of foodstuffs 
between French people, against promises by Pétain.30 Then, two days later, André Labarthe 
lambasted the ‘pillage organisé’ of France by the occupier and, echoing Churchill, argued 
that the blockade would hasten Germany’s defeat.31 
The nature and tone of this opening engagement demonstrate that both Vichy and the 
French Service considered the argument about food crucial to their propaganda, but that 
each was also aware of the challenges it posed them. Vichy knew from its prefects’ reports 
that problems with the circulation of food between and within the two zones were highly 
damaging for both producers and consumers. It also knew that the French people blamed 
these problems on the absence of an overall plan for food supply and distribution, which 
put the regime in the front line for popular discontent.32 But if Vichy could tap into age-old 
Anglo-French tensions and convince the population that Britain cared nothing for ordinary 
French people, then this could shake confidence in Britain as a friend and ally, and possibly 
divert critical attention from the regime. If effective propaganda is based on factual truth—
as the arch-propagandist Goebbels believed, and as the sociologist Ellul has discussed—then 
this was a potentially damaging argument for the French Service, for none could deny the 
reality of the Mers el-Kébir incident.33 Although not unconcerned by events off North Africa, 
the French in France were, however, more likely to fixate on a truth closer to home and 
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more relevant to their personal circumstances. From September 1940, French Service 
strategy emphasized consistently that French privations resulted not from the British 
blockade, but from Germany’s calculated decision to starve the French by enacting a 
systematic plan to asset-strip France and reduce her to misery.34 The argument connected 
more intimately than Baudouin’s with the actual experiences of listeners. They knew that 
pre-war France had been virtually self-sufficient in a number of foodstuffs.35 Now, however, 
they could no longer access food produced elsewhere in the country and witnessed pillaging 
by the Germans first-hand, going hungry as a result, as the BBC’s correspondents from 
France had described. 
When it came, rationing—presaged by Pétain in his broadcast on 13 August and 
introduced on 23 September 1940, and applying first to the staples of bread, meat, sugar 
and fats—was rapidly incorporated into this attack. As Grenard notes, the need for rationing 
in France had become apparent even before the Germans arrived in the summer of 1940, 
but its introduction corresponded in people’s minds with their presence, a context which 
compromised the creation and reception of the system.36 Georges Boris—a pre-war 
economist who became the French Service’s principal speaker on food and economic 
issues—capitalized on this association. On 27 September, he emphasized that German 
exactions and pillaging were the only explanation for the introduction of rationing in a 
country which had enjoyed near food autonomy pre-war. The occupier’s requirement that 
all French people be allocated lower rations than the Germans was proof that Hitler 
considered France an inferior country, and Vichy’s compliance was nothing short of 
capitulation.37 The possible power of such an argument was not to be underestimated. 
Conscious of the likely negative impact on public opinion of the introduction of rationing, 
Vichy sought in early October 1940 to dissociate itself from responsibility, and to emphasize 
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to French people ‘[que] l’armée d’occupation consomme sur notre territoire une portion 
très appréciable de denrées alimentaires et que les taux des rations ont été fixés 
conformément aux indications expresses des autorités allemandes’.38 Pétain himself 
broadcast the line to the French on 9 October, defining rationing as ‘une pénible nécessité’ 
and packaging it in moralistic terms which strove to boost faith in Vichy and to generate and 
appeal to a sense of national solidarity: ‘[N]ous avons voulu assurer l’égalité de tous devant 
le sacrifice’, he announced. ‘Chacun devra prendre sa part des privations communes sans 
que la fortune puisse les épargner aux uns et la misère les rendre plus lourdes aux autres’.39 
But the regime was already failing on its promises, for, just days later, a report on the 
situation in the occupied zone highlighted the ‘inégalité des fortunes’ faced by the Parisian 
working classes. Obliged to survive on bread and potatoes due to a combination of the 
scarcity of other foods at official prices and the high prices demanded by an already 
emerging black market, they now found even these basics unobtainable. Moreover, while 
milk was plentiful in rural regions, notably Normandy, supplies to Paris were painfully 
irregular, a failing that was causing ‘incidents’ as shops turned customers away. France, the 
report headlined starkly, was on the threshold of ‘un hiver qui s’annonce difficile’; and it 
warned that public opinion was marked by anti-German feeling, a renewal of Anglophilia, 
and a worrying detachment from Vichy, widely judged guilty of food mismanagement.40 The 
prevailing grim circumstances fired these attitudes, and they were compounded by the 
French Service’s broadcasts. In November 1940, public opinion was judged ‘extrêmement 
sensible à la propagande de la radio anglaise’, blaming Germany and Vichy for everything.41 
London knew this, and used propaganda to target specific communities. On 2 March 1941, 
for example, a gendered, highly emotive broadcast by the evocatively named Mme Paris 
 11 
 
praised demonstrations by Parisian mothers who had no milk for their children, while 
German soldiers had plenty.42 
 
III 
 
Food has been described as Vichy’s Achilles heel. The regime failed to honour its pledge of 
equality of access, and this was one of the major causes of the divorce between the regime 
and public opinion from 1941.43 Food miseries overshadowed the lives of many ordinary 
people during the extremely harsh winter of 1940–41. In his New Year broadcast on 31 
December 1940, Pétain admitted that, in 1941, ‘nous aurons faim’. Unsurprisingly, he 
neither admitted to deficiencies by Vichy in food management nor attributed responsibility 
to Germany’s exactions, but instead blamed the war for depriving France of much of her 
harvest, as well as Britain’s ongoing blockade. But his earlier pledge to ensure ‘une 
alimentation suffisante’ was now modified. Vichy would do what it could, he said, but ‘Je 
fais appel à l'ingéniosité des Français pour qu'ils improvisent eux-mêmes les moyens de 
compléter leur alimentation’.44 
Whether the message was intended or not, Pétain’s words can easily be construed as 
an endorsement of alternative methodologies and markets, and were no doubt thus 
interpreted by many French. Insufficient official rations inevitably prompted consumers to 
supplement their provisions elsewhere. In urban areas especially, by early 1941, those who 
could were already compensating for the shortcomings of Vichy’s systems. By May, the 
population was increasingly blaming the Ravitaillement général (RG)―Vichy’s food supply 
body―for their food problems, taxing it ‘de malhonnêteté et d’incapacité’.45 At the same 
time, Vichy’s systems brought it into conflict with food producers, discouraging observance 
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of its many rules. Farmers rapidly resented the low fixed food prices imposed by Vichy, as 
well as what they considered excessive requisitioning by the RG, considered unsympathetic 
to different local circumstances. In response, as Mouré argues, some farmers halted output, 
or withheld produce from official markets, either consuming more themselves or selling for 
better prices elsewhere.46 Rationing, the black market, and a widespread perception that 
farmers were benefiting from the exceptional circumstances increased tensions between 
town and country, as wartime diaries and letters received by the BBC indicate.47 But hunger-
based antagonisms also raged within towns and cities. Here, for example, customers 
suspected shopkeepers of reserving stock for rich black-market clients and selling food 
intended for ordinary people to restaurants at inflated prices; or they grumbled about the 
priority cards accorded to certain consumers (principally familles nombreuses and mutilés de 
guerre) which allowed them to bypass queues.48 
The fracturing of social and economic interests between rich and poor, city and 
countryside, posed a real challenge to both the French Service and Vichy’s efforts to foster 
French unity and solidarity, which both considered of significant political value in the wider 
wartime context. From August 1941, the British PWE’s French Service directives increasingly 
referred to mutual solidarity between the French in France as one of the most effective 
contributions to resistance which ordinary people could make. But the PWE was also aware 
that there was a ‘concrete problem of French unity’, and that broadcasts needed ‘to avoid 
any line which suggests that we are dividing France against herself’. To boost morale, it 
advised, the French ‘must be given every encouragement to think they are united, or are at 
least doing their utmost to sink their differences’. Food was an obvious theme to aid in the 
promotion of this message, given that ‘the major immediate preoccupations of Frenchmen 
are to get rid of the Germans and to get something into their tummies’.49 Vichy was similarly 
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conscious of tensions across France, and that these needed to be addressed. To that end, it 
equally focussed on French solidarity, packaging this as a duty, as the PWE noted. In a 
retrospective document produced in March 1944, the PWE detailed how Vichy had striven 
consistently ‘to explain the worker and the farmer, the town and the country, one to the 
other, stressing the importance of their collaboration and mutual understanding’, manifestly 
in the interests of national cohesion.50 Both Vichy and the French Service endeavoured to 
tailor their food propaganda to convince these different communities that they recognized 
and were sympathetic to their particular (and often dissimilar) situations and grievances. 
Broadcast content was thus influenced by the increasingly fraught food situation on the 
ground, and by resultant food behaviour. As we shall see, encouraging ethical food conduct 
and positioning this as patriotic was central to their messages. Censuring greedy or 
dishonest food behaviour was an obvious way of connecting with the sentiments of hungry 
French. Food citizenship was encouraged from those who had more, whether farmers 
themselves, or those with useful connections in the country, or the financially comfortable 
who could buy easy access to food. But these strategies had to be implemented so that they 
did not alienate those whose food behaviour was not entirely principled, whether 
consumers looking to find ways to fill their stomachs or farmers keen to safeguard their 
livelihoods. 
 
IV 
 
Throughout the Occupation, both Vichy and the French Service expended much energy on 
getting France’s farmers on side. Vichy understood that it was important ‘de ne pas irriter 
profondément le paysan sur la bonne volonté duquel repose en définitive la bonne marche 
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du système’, for, if farmers could be persuaded to cooperate with Vichy’s food edicts, this 
could serve to boost public opinion of the regime.51 For the French Service, if producers 
could be convinced that Vichy was anti-farmer, this could serve to entrench negative 
reception of Vichy’s food policies and foster support for resistance. Appealing to farmers, 
the PWE directed, was thus a ‘long-term task’.52 
From summer 1940, Vichy strove to flatter farmers as key instruments of national 
regeneration. Its star agricultural enterprise was intended to be the Corporation paysanne, 
envisioned as an independent body which would unite France’s rural forces and―in Pétain’s 
words―‘donner à la paysannerie la place qui lui a été longtemps refusée dans la nation’.53 
But the Corporation failed to materialize as intended. Lackerstein contends that escalating 
food shortages and German requisitioning instead swiftly turned it into ‘a state bureaucracy 
to control supply and prices’.54 This fed farmers’ perceptions that it was, as Alary 
summarizes, ‘une abstraction administrative conduisant à les éloigner du Maréchal’ and ‘un 
instrument au service du pillage allemand’.55 Moreover, the delay between the 
Corporation’s creation on 2 December 1940 and its formalization in law on 16 December 
1942 proved damaging to its prospects, for, in between, farmers largely ignored its 
projects.56 By the time the Corporation was finally established in 1943, it was too late to 
reverse attitudes, and prefects commented that the body lacked authority over farmers.57 
The French Service forcefully exploited farmers’ perceptions of the Corporation, arguing on 
4 July 1943 that it was ‘un produit du nazisme’ whose ‘tendance autoritaire’ threatened 
their cherished autonomy.58 At the same time, broadcasts strove to foster confidence in the 
Allies, emphasizing that French agricultural renewal was actively on their agenda for post-
war France.59 Together, these broadcasts contained a powerful double message: Vichy’s so-
called agricultural reforms had emptied the French countryside to the benefit of the 
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Germans and the detriment of farmers; and Germany—the ultimate food villain—was 
debilitating France with Vichy’s connivance;.60 
The French Service’s representation of the Corporation paysanne formed just one 
component of its extensive programme from summer 1940 to persuade farmers that 
trusting in Vichy made neither financial nor patriotic sense. On 13 August, Pétain broadcast 
Vichy’s commitment to the rapid return of rural life to its usual rhythm after the disruption 
and devastation caused by the German invasion, pledging a significant pot of cash to hasten 
revitalization.61 The promise, and the strategy, went neither unnoticed nor unchallenged by 
the French Service. On 26 August, it also spoke to farmers in financial terms. Farmers were 
no fools, it said, and knew that Vichy’s promises meant nothing, for French agriculture 
would find itself sacrificed to the occupier in the same way as French industry. This would 
compound farmers’ current financial difficulties, for Germany would compel them to sell 
their produce to her at low prices, and poverty would result.62 Further thematically 
connected broadcasts followed from each side. On 31 December 1940, and no doubt in 
cognizance of their swift resentment of the RG, Pétain called on farmers to increase output 
in spite of the difficulties they faced, effectively positioning the assuaging of French hunger 
as their patriotic duty.63 Three weeks later, the French Service equally engaged with the 
question of output, albeit rather differently. Boris sympathized with farmers, stating that it 
was understandable that many preferred to halt their output rather than ruin themselves in 
a high-inflation context which meant that it cost more to produce food than could be 
recouped at official prices. A few exceptions aside, farmers were no profiteers, he asserted, 
but simply ‘de malheureuses victimes des Allemands tout comme les gens des villes’, a 
statement which, in the interests of promoting national solidarity, was no doubt intended as 
much for town-dwellers as for farmers themselves.64  
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References to national solidarity pervaded Vichy’s addresses to farmers about the 
supply of wheat and the production of bread, a food staple of symbolic cultural value in 
France, as Strand notes.65 When bread poverty threatened France in spring 1941 and spring 
1942, Vichy heaped blame on the British blockade and applied moral pressure on farmers. 
On 2 March 1941, Jean Achard, secrétaire d’État au Ravitaillement, appealed to ‘le 
sentiment de solidarité des agriculteurs’, arguing that, since bread was sacred to them, they 
understood better than anyone its importance to every French person. But he added a 
healthy note of pragmatism in case this reasoning failed to persuade, offering farmers a 
time-limited financial incentive in return for their wheat.66 Subsequently, on 20 April, Pétain 
emphasized Vichy’s principles of service and obedience when he called on farmers to deliver 
their entire yield into the food chain, as required by Vichy’s food rules, defining respect for 
these by producers and consumers alike as ‘une discipline vitale pour tous’.67 In response, 
the French Service headlined the same message throughout 1941: German requisitioning 
and Vichy’s acquiescence, not farmers, were responsible for all instances of bread 
deficiency.68 But by October prefects across the occupied zone were complaining of 
‘l’égoïsme paysan’, deploring behaviour which demonstrated ‘l’âpreté la plus sordide et un 
manque total de solidarité’.69 Farmers could not be challenged in such inflammatory terms, 
of course, if Vichy wanted their compliance. But, when the bread situation worsened in 
1942, after another bad winter, Pétain adopted a harder line. On 29 March, he insisted that 
farmers deliver all their reserve wheat stocks to the RG within three weeks: hiding or 
wasting wheat would deprive country people and townsfolk alike of bread, and was ‘un 
crime impardonnable’; no farmer should fail to comply.70 On 16 April, Paul Creyssel, Vichy’s 
directeur des Services de la propagande since 30 March, followed up with a cautionary 
broadcast, indicating that Pétain would much prefer farmers to hand over their wheat freely 
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than to have to coerce them.71 Then, on 20 April, Pierre Laval, reinstalled as head of the 
French government two days earlier, outlined his programme to ‘save’ France. Willing to 
employ a confrontational vocabulary, Laval stated that privations had resulted from 
widespread ‘égoïsme et appât de gain’. He then called for solidarity, before paying court to 
farmers’ ‘générosité quand la vie de France est en jeu’. Force was not the answer, he 
indicated, offering instead the inducement of the eventual return of their freedom to 
operate without state intervention, and asking them meanwhile to work the land in the 
national interest as passionately as he would defend it.72 Such broadcasts offered the 
French Service an opportunity to contend that Vichy was alternately threatening, blaming 
and flattering farmers; instead, it should acknowledge its own part, alongside Germany’s, in 
France’s hunger.73 Boris attacked Laval explicitly, claiming his reference to French greed was 
specifically directed at farmers. But farmers knew, he affirmed, that Laval’s masters―the 
Germans―were really to blame.74 Creyssel took to the airwaves again on 28 May 1942 to 
affirm that ‘la bataille du blé a été gagnée’, a claim no doubt designed to instil confidence in 
Vichy and to coax hesitant farmers into compliance.75 But the assertion was hollow, as 
confirmed by the continuing bread shortages on the official market, and by Vichy’s own 
repeated exhortations to farmers throughout 1942 and 1943. 
A significant problem faced by the French Service was that Laval’s connection of 
French privations with greed in April 1942 had some basis in truth, and farmers in particular 
were in a position to profit. One striking letter sent to the BBC on 27 July 1942 noted that 
townsfolk largely held farmers responsible for the lack of goods at market and condemned 
their ‘goût de gain [qui] ne connai[t] aucune retenue’.76 In September, the PWE concluded 
that farmers’ unwillingness to send their produce to markets was a major factor in the poor 
urban food situation, and that the rift between town and country was becoming more 
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dangerous.77 The French Service was just as keen as Vichy for farmers not to withhold their 
produce. But it is notable that it never directly confronted farmers about their practices, 
preferring to engage with them differently. Where Vichy’s patriotism required farmers to 
turn their goods in to the RG, the French Service endorsed and encouraged non-compliance 
with Vichy. It offered farmers a moral alternative which suggested how they could operate 
in support of their compatriots, on the basis that ‘l’entraide de tous doit tenir les Allemands 
en échec’.78 Notably, in 1943, the French Service promoted fair trade practices outside 
Vichy’s systems, calling on farmers to ‘organise[r] la vente directe, et à juste prix, de vos 
produits aux gens des villes’.79 Broadcasts emphasized Vichy’s willingness to adopt 
increasingly draconian measures—mimicking the occupier—to compel farmers to hand over 
their wheat reserves at one go, and called on farmers to deliver only the minimum required 
at regular monthly intervals. Keeping wheat back from Vichy and Germany in this way was 
‘résistance énergique’ and part of ‘le bon combat pour la libération de notre patrie’.80 
Reserves should instead be put to ‘better’ use by donating them to ‘patriotes traqués’ in 
hiding from the STO.81 Boris pushed the patriotism button determinedly: Vichy was the 
‘anti-France’ which had declared war on agricultural workers, thereby suggesting an easy 
logic which offered farmers an appealing self-image as the incarnation of the ‘true’ France.82 
In the light of the steadily worsening food situation, from early 1943 the PWE further 
emphasized that advocating complete solidarity between French people in France during 
the tough months ahead was an important way to help them realize how they could best 
contribute to ‘present and future resistance’. Any French in a relatively privileged position 
had to be made to understand that they should use that margin to help others less 
fortunately placed.83 Farmers were not the only ones to be food-privileged, of course, but 
they formed a substantial proportion of that category. So, putting the PWE’s policy into 
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practice, French Service broadcasts encouraged townsfolk and farmers respectively to 
understand the difficulties the other faced.84 Others profiled positive images of interaction 
and cooperation between town and country, no doubt in the hope that these would 
encourage their emulation across France. Many of these used children’s experiences as an 
emotional lever, either praising the aid farmers were already offering—such as taking in city 
children—or appealing for their help so that children might have enough to eat or so that 
more could escape urban misery.85 This portrait of French solidarity made no reference to 
instances of tension between suspicious farmers and anxious urban parents.86 Nor did it 
engage with increasing urban hostility to farmers throughout 1943, of which the PWE was 
well aware.87  
 
V 
 
Vichy’s attack on Britain and her allies as France’s food enemies took on a new ferocity 
when Philippe Henriot entered the war of words in February 1942. A specialist in alarmism, 
Henriot unashamedly manipulated French hunger, endeavouring to stoke up Anglophobia in 
particular: France’s pain was intentional, he contended, for Britain was behind ‘des famines 
scientifiquement organisées’.88 Significantly, Henriot added ‘false’ French to the British on 
his list of food ‘criminals’. In one particularly emotive broadcast designed to alienate the 
inhabitants of metropolitan France from the Free French in London, Henriot argued that, 
well fed by the British, those in London had forgotten those who suffered at home as a 
result of Britain’s seizure of food cargo in passage from the French Empire to the 
metropole.89 As the Allies took Vichy-controlled Madagascar in May 1942, he described 
North Africa, ‘le dernier grenier de notre ravitaillement’, as a quarry on which Britain 
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preyed.90 Then, when the Allies landed in North Africa on 8 November 1942, cutting off 
supplies to France, while Creyssel soberly explained the food problems this posed for 
France, Henriot melodramatically foretold famine.91 On 18 November, Max Bonnafous, then 
Vichy’s ministre de l’Agriculture et du ravitaillement, also outlined the food difficulties 
France would face.92 In London, the PWE predicted that enemy propaganda would further 
exaggerate the deficiencies and present these as the ‘Anglo-Saxon seizure of larder’.93 
Henriot didn’t disappoint. On 6 December, he portrayed the British gorging on desirable 
foodstuffs such as oranges and figs which had been intended for France, but which had 
been offered up instead to the so-called liberator by ‘les Giraud, les Darlan, les Boisson’. 
These men had switched allegiance from Vichy to the Allies, before or at the time of the 
landing. Henriot’s message was unambiguous: French who thus ‘abandoned’ Vichy were the 
anti-France, and were colluding in the starvation of their compatriots back home.94 
Throughout 1943, Henriot further used food issues to try to undermine confidence in Britain 
as France’s friend and liberator. No doubt inspired by Vichy’s reports that public opinion 
was concerned about food supply following the landing, he repeatedly stressed that Britain 
had taken France’s Empire and her food, and that her blockade of continental Europe was 
intended to foment civil war in France.95 British actions had placed Vichy in the position 
where, in the absence of resources from North Africa, it had had to ask farmers to attempt 
the impossible if France were not to starve. Britain, not Vichy, was to blame for French 
hunger and for the pressure on farmers.96 
 Blaming ‘outsiders’ for food shortages could unite ‘insiders’ in support of Vichy, but 
the case needed to be credible. The PWE considered that the French would not be 
convinced by Henriot’s claims when they were set against Germany’s systematic pillaging, 
especially because events in North Africa raised hopes in France of the shortening of the 
 21 
 
war.97 Consequently, the French Service adopted a twin strategy: it reinforced its 
representation of the occupier’s food behaviour; and it contrasted the difficult food 
situation in France with the relatively better situation in Britain, where, contrary to the 
claims of German propaganda and despite rationing, the British did not go hungry.98 This 
was potentially a risky approach since it could rile hungry French. Indeed, the French Service 
conceded that it could seem cruel. But it justified its references to hunger, maintaining that 
these confirmed that listeners’ food pain was recognized, and that they had not been 
abandoned, as Henriot alleged. Moreover, it was equally essential, it explained, to 
communicate to those who might not have witnessed German pillaging that this was the 
true reason for their hunger.99 Other broadcasts profiled Britain’s rationing system as an 
efficient operation based on cooperation between government and growers, which ensured 
that Britons had at least ‘le nécessaire’.100 
 The contrast with the failings of Vichy’s official food systems was stark, and unlikely to 
have been missed by listeners. Many people saw only too well the inconsistency between 
the dismal reality of their daily lives and propaganda films such as ‘Nourrir la France’ (1942) 
or ’Terres fidèles’ (1942), which portrayed a regime in control, working hard successfully to 
manage food supply and distribution.101 People could see that there was food available, but 
that it was going to those with privilege, power, opportunity and money, often via the black 
market. Vichy officially deplored the black market, and the daily press was littered with the 
specifics of its food legislation alongside particulars of the punishments handed out.102 But 
Vichy itself did not practise what it preached. As Grenard demonstrates, Vichy used the 
black market to supply the restaurants its ministers frequented, protecting the traffickers 
involved from pursuit under its own laws. Elsewhere, dishonest RG staff misappropriated 
foodstuffs, facilitated trafficking or illegally traded ration tickets.103 The French Service 
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exploited this context with the aim of cultivating a disconnection between ordinary French 
people and Vichy. It contended that the regime fostered profiteering, for Vichy had made it 
easy for ‘un malin sans scrupule [de] faire son beurre dans la Révolution nationale’, but it 
neatly distinguished the unscrupulous from ‘le peuple français [qui] a soif de vengeance’.104 
It also contrasted the situation of people who survived on a few francs a day with that of 
big-name Vichyites such as Darlan and Joseph Barthélemy, who ‘n’aiment point à se priver’ 
and ate fabulous multi-course meals in fine ‘ministerial’ restaurants.105 Targeting high-
ranking Vichy officials or discredited politicians who had espoused the German cause was a 
major tenet of PWE policy. Significantly, the PWE refused to implicate ordinary French 
people who worked in the lower ranks of Vichy’s administration; rather, they should be 
encouraged to help the Allied cause. But the PWE equally emphasized that these French 
could not be expected to speak openly in favour of resistance and Britain should not give 
the impression that this was expected.106 The policy demonstrates how important the PWE 
considered it not to alienate ordinary people in France. It thus sharply criticized Jacques 
Duchesne’s broadcast on 22 September 1942, in which he glibly maintained that Vichy’s 
supply and distribution inspectors had become ‘maîtres chanteurs, de véritables gangsters’. 
The PWE was concerned that such people, if attacked, might be discouraged from 
obstructing Germany’s exploitation of France.107 There is no evidence that French opinion 
received this broadcast badly. But the French Service was clearly back on message by 9 
October, when Jacques Borel delivered a long broadcast which emphasized the distinction 
between corrupt Vichy officials and the ‘true’ ‘peuple français’.108 
 A significant problem for both Vichy and the French Service was that, for many in a 
position to profit, the pursuit of self-interest far outweighed the principle of national 
solidarity: unethical traders manipulated food prices and rules to their advantage; 
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unscrupulous rail or postal workers stole food parcels in transit; and even charitable 
collections organized by Vichy’s Secours national were diverted for personal gain.109 A black 
market for food existed because the shortcomings of Vichy’s systems, combined with 
Germany’s exactions, created the need for alternative food sources; and it spiralled during 
the Occupation because needs grew as the situation on the ground worsened. As the black 
market escalated, consumers reportedly wanted Vichy to impose stricter controls, together 
with tough punishments for profiteers.110 However, as extensive archival research by 
Grenard confirms, while in 1940–41, the black market was largely the preserve of profiteers 
operating ‘en marge du commerce normal et honnête’, from late 1941 it came to involve 
‘tout un peuple en marge de la légalité’.111 So, lambasting it in blanket terms could prove 
counter-productive for both the French Service and Vichy. Such an approach could suggest a 
lack of sensitivity to listeners forced to negotiate hugely difficult circumstances who, in 
order to ‘get by’ or to ‘help out’, used aspects of the black market such as swapping or 
trading foodstuffs, or buying direct at unofficial prices from producers in the country.112 
The French Service’s and Vichy’s respective points of view accidentally coincided when 
both relativized the existence of the black market. Both consistently took issue with 
recidivist profiteers, a strategy likely to find a receptive audience amongst the many people 
who could not afford to access the black market, as well as those who used it but resented 
the high prices they had to pay. Both targeted those they deemed responsible for the black 
market (although their villains differed), exonerating the majority of French people. But 
each side also found ways to rationalize the black market as this became more widespread, 
often constructing their argument around their respective notions of patriotism and 
national solidarity in an effort not to alienate opinion. In his New Year broadcast on 1 
January 1942, for example, Pétain described black-market traffickers as ‘adversaires de 
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l’unité française’.113 The same year, official propaganda films positioned profiteering as 
unpatriotic: in ‘La France est foutue’, for instance, a bright-eyed young patriot castigates a 
louche profiteer and extols the ‘real’ France.114 But, at the same time, Vichy’s approach 
evolved towards greater tolerance of small-scale trafficking, for on 15 March 1942, it passed 
a law which established ‘une répression différenciée’ between those who sold on the black 
market for profit, whose practices were deemed particularly harmful to France, and those 
who traded to feed their families.115 Radio propaganda took the attack on profiteers much 
further, to try to score precise political points. While Creyssel, for example, positively 
profiled Laval as the defender of ordinary French exploited by undefined black-market 
profiteers, Henriot added a political angle to the identity of black-market criminals which 
targeted Vichy’s enemies but without pointing the finger at French people generally.116 In an 
oblique nod to the legislation of March 1942, he affirmed that the black market did not 
mean farmers occasionally selling the odd item from the farm door, perhaps at a price 
modestly above the official rate, or ordinary folk driven by desperation to get food for their 
families. Rather, the black market meant the colossal trade in which the unscrupulous 
indulged. Highlighting two recent such incidents reported in the press, Henriot queried how 
many of those who operated in the black market were Gaullists or Anglophiles.117 This was a 
natural question to ask, he insisted sarcastically, given that ‘Pour les gaullistes de tout poil, 
en effet, le marché noir est une vertu patriotique, recommandée depuis le début par la 
radio anglaise’. The French Service’s encouragement to farmers from February 1943 not to 
hand over their foodstuffs to Vichy’s RG, which we noted earlier, was one example picked 
out by Henriot of its promotion of the black market. His equation was simple: food villains 
were all Gaullists and Anglophiles, justified in their behaviour by a French Service in London 
which had a skewed notion of patriotism and no care for the French collective.118 For its 
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part, the French Service held Germany and Vichy responsible for the black market. It 
contended that Vichy’s failure to feed France adequately condemned the less well-off to 
famine and prompted the wealthier to turn to the black market, intensifying social 
inequalities. Unjust as it was, without it many more French would die of hunger.119 The 
black market was also a means for the French Service to drive a wedge between the French 
people and Vichy. To that end, it argued that, while German pillaging and Vichy’s failings 
had brought about the black market, and while German use of the black market was 
exacerbating the problems, Laval preferred to place responsibility for it on ordinary people, 
who were simply trying to survive.120 As 1943 progressed, the black market underwent ‘un 
processus de légitimation patriotique’, with failure to respect rules increasingly presented as 
acts of sabotage and resistance.121 This evolution was reflected in French Service output, 
which positively spun black-market practices within a narrative of national solidarity. Hence, 
for example, it contrasted the torrent of black-market produce flooding to Germany—with 
Vichy’s connivance—to the ‘petites fournitures privées que commande la solidarité 
nationale’, which it represented as ‘un ruisselet qu’alimente l’amitié entre Français’.122 The 
message was one of empathy: those who calculatingly profited from the misery of others 
were very different to ordinary French people who exchanged or traded supplies in what 
the French Service termed a ‘marché blanc’.123 
Henriot repeatedly marshalled food-related incidents to cultivate a disconnection 
between ordinary French people and the resistance similar to the one fostered by the 
French Service between the people and Vichy. Thefts from farms, crop-burning and harvest 
sabotage occurred throughout the Occupation, but increased in number in 1943 and 
1944.124 Such episodes became a focus for Henriot’s speciality of scaremongering 
propaganda, as he attempted to recruit to Vichy’s law and order message farmers who had 
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experienced or were fearful of attacks on their lands. Harvest fires were burning across 
France, he proclaimed, and farmers were being killed. Those responsible were ‘false’ French, 
‘terrorists’ and ‘bandits’, his favourite terms for the Maquis, France’s domestic resistance 
movement.125 In early 1944, Henriot painted an unremittingly negative portrait of the 
Maquis as thieves, which was designed to isolate them from the nation by positioning 
ordinary French as their victims. Appealing to mothers in particular, on 9 February 1944, for 
example, he evoked the Maquis as ‘assassins d’enfants, affameurs d’enfants’ in his account 
of the theft on 19 January of 112 cases of condensed milk from a dairy factory in Rumilly 
(Haute-Savoie), carried out, he claimed, by a ruthless gang of forty so-called ‘patriotes’, 
most of them foreigners or Jews.126 Throughout February, the French Service responded 
with a positive portrayal of the Maquis as ‘fils de France’ and of a population ‘mobilisée 
pour les secourir’.127 It depicted Maquis fighters as honest and disciplined, who paid for 
goods they needed if these were not donated, who abided by a rulebook, and who dealt 
firmly with any undesirable elements.128 The truth behind the Rumilly affair is not known. 
No details have been traced in archives, and no newspaper reports have been found. An 
account of the incident written post-war by a local historian states that seventeen members 
of the Maquis took seventy cases of milk, some of which they donated to refugee children. 
This suggests that Henriot had exaggerated, a plausible conclusion given his tendency for 
alarmist propaganda. But, although the post-war narrative is ostensibly based on local 
archives, no traceable source is cited as proof.129 Moreover, the French Service’s 
representation of the Maquis would have rung hollow with those French who had faced 
shortages as a result of the Maquis’s requisitioning of supplies, or who had witnessed 
criminal food behaviour by ‘faux Maquis’ as opposed to ‘des résistants dignes de ce nom’.130 
Neither representation of the Maquis can therefore be considered reliable. But together 
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they sharply demonstrate the relativities of interpretation in play at the time. What was 
important was whom the French chose to believe. 
 
VI 
 
Since food was so important to daily existence during the Occupation, winning the hunger 
blame game was a potentially valuable way for both the French Service and Vichy to score 
propaganda points against one another. Both consistently used the food supply situation to 
foster a disconnection between the French people and the ‘enemy’ and to promote their 
own narrative of patriotism. For each, affameurs were the villains of the wartime food 
landscape. As we have seen, in Vichy’s world this meant Britain, her allies, ‘false’ French 
abroad, and ‘undesirables’ at home; for the French Service it meant Vichy and Germany. It 
was an uncomplicated dichotomy which underpinned their respective propaganda 
endeavours throughout the Occupation. Despite Vichy’s intensive efforts, public opinion 
seems overall to have held the occupier and the government primarily responsible for the 
worsening domestic food situation, no doubt because Germany’s exactions and Vichy’s 
failings were directly experienced at close hand on a daily basis across France. The French 
Service constantly exploited the opportunities that this situation offered. 
Trickier to handle for both the French Service and Vichy was the food behaviour of the 
French at large, as moral boundaries disintegrated in the difficult context of widespread 
hunger. Getting by and profiteering had to be differentiated if ordinary French were not to 
feel attacked, which could risk their wider alienation. While the French Service and Vichy 
both criticized large-scale profiteers, smaller-scale trading was downplayed. This meant that 
the food survival strategies of many ordinary people were linked both to the special 
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circumstances as well as to the message of French solidarity and patriotism which each side 
sought to promote in the interests of their overall political message. Farmers’ role in food 
supply and distribution rendered them a particular target for the respective propaganda 
efforts of the French Service and Vichy, and each constructed an appropriate empathizing 
narrative. In one respect, the French Service had the easier part, since, unlike Vichy, it did 
not have to deal with the fallout of farmers’ reluctance to comply with the food rules, 
something which put regime and paysannerie on a collision course. Whilst never itself 
directly criticizing farmers, the French Service took advantage of this situation to allege that 
Vichy was anti-farmer and could not be trusted. 
To suggest that all farmers were driven by profit rather than patriotism, or that all 
town-dwellers suffered misery as a result of farmers’ practices, would be to fail to take 
sufficient account of the nuances of wartime behaviour and experience. Indeed, resistance 
was also an important feature of rural life in France. Many farmers supported the Maquis, 
especially as the landing in June 1944 approached, and must have abhorred Vichy’s 
propaganda.131 But, at the same time, prefects’ reports for Vichy in early 1944 especially 
show that other farmers regarded the Maquis’s requisitioning of food as theft, and must 
have wondered why the French Service called on them to support those they perceived as 
lawless.132 Equally, urban French who were living in food penury must have wondered why 
the French Service did not speak to farmers more robustly, while many who were surviving 
in all likelihood turned a deaf ear to the message of food solidarity. Such vast differences of 
experience and individual interest perhaps explain why both the French Service’s and 
Vichy’s efforts to foster national solidarity through food seem not to have been widely 
heeded. Indeed, their repeated calls for French unity were a tacit acknowledgement that 
disunity prevailed throughout the Occupation. Tensions even worsened in the early months 
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of 1944, giving serious cause for alarm.133 The French Service and Vichy both worked to gain 
the advantage in the battle for public opinion over food. But, in the end, and precisely in the 
interests of not alienating opinion, both opted for the safer territory of the middle ground in 
their discourse on food to ordinary French people. Food propaganda in France thus 
responded to sensitivities and competing interests, and was advanced in an uneasy and very 
uncharacteristic state of compromise. 
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